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Abstract 
 
 This MQP evaluated four policies aiming to eliminate piracy off the Somali coast.  The 
rise in piracy caused global concern; in 2009, more than 20 warships from several nations were 
deployed on anti-piracy missions.  The Pirate Fisherman Model was built using system 
dynamics, and allowed for simulating, testing, and comparison of the four policies. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 Shipping by sea remains a vital method of transporting goods between nations.  Piracy 
has become an increasing problem that has affected both commercial and private shipping, 
especially off the coast of Somalia.  Somalia, a third world country on the horn of Africa, has a 
population of fishermen that convert to pirates in efforts to remove themselves from poverty.  
These pirates join together under a leader and make organized and planned attacks, seizing 
ships with valuable cargo (including oil and military tanks) and holding its crew hostage until 
their demand for ransom is met. 
With number of pirate attacks increasing every year since 2006, along with increasing 
amounts of ransoms paid, this problem has drawn international attention.  Naval forces from 
dozens of countries, including the US, have been tasked with patrolling international waters off 
of Somalia and providing safe passage for ships.  This Major Qualifying Project hopes to 
simulate the best policies that the international community should enact to stop piracy and 
provide safety to shipping lanes. 
Simulations are done through the use of the system dynamics software iThink.  The 
main policies compared are:  1.  Increase the amount of external law enforcement (such as US 
Navy ships) to capture and arrest pirates,  2.  Create a Somali police force that can arrest 
pirates,  3.  Adjust fisherman income, so fewer fishermen are tempted to become pirates to 
avoid poverty,  4.  Demand that nations whose ships are being ransomed refuse to pay the 
pirates, reducing the pirate payoff.  The president of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, 
hopes to establish a Somali police force or army to deal with pirates; while this is a realistic 
goal, the country does not currently have enough funds to establish such a force.  However, the 
simulation model was adapted to account for this possible force, and its effects. 
The policies will be evaluated for benefits and effectiveness, and the end result will be 
recommendations for the international community, Somali government leaders, and even the 
foreign forces serving to stop pirates.  The amount of time needed for the effects of the policies 
to appear, the cost of policy implementation, and the overall effectiveness of the policy will be 
taken into account to determine the best policy for recommendation. 
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Chapter 2:  Background 
 
2.1  History of Piracy 
Pirates have become a symbol for menace and lawlessness.  Historical records from over 
2,000 years ago indicate that early civilizations, such as the Greeks and Romans, dealt with 
piracy.  A story tells of Julius Caesar being ransomed by pirates, whom he returned to crucify; 
ancient Egyptian records tell of Cyprus being attacked by Lukkan pirates; Alexander the Great 
battled in vain against numerous pirates in the Mediterranean (Raffaele, 2007).  Some 
civilizations, such as the Vikings, were based upon the attacking of other ships and raiding 
villages along coastline. 
The Golden Age of Piracy was between 1620 and 1720, when piracy was often 
authorized by governments.  Referred to as “privateering,” ships were encouraged to attack 
and plunder ships from other nations, then share profits with their government (Royal Naval 
Museum Library, 2002). 
Life on a merchant ship in the Golden Age of Piracy was considered extremely harsh.  
Sailors were often underpaid on commercial ships.  Pirate crews would receive portions of 
plunder, and were not held to obey national laws.  Pirate captains, after capturing a ship, would 
ask for volunteers to join his or her crew.  The desire for more pay (or plunder) was motivation 
for honest sailors to turn to a life of piracy (Royal Naval Museum Library, 2002). 
  2.1.1  Additional terms  
 There are several terms that are variations of “pirate.”  Privateers, as previously 
mentioned, were authorized by a government to plunder enemy ships.  Buccaneers were 
pirates (and privateers) that operated primarily in the West Indies and Caribbean.  Corsairs, 
known to sail the Mediterranean, took on a religious connotation, typically Christian or Muslim.  
A recognized Muslim sect known as the Barbary Corsairs kept in the region of Northern Africa.  
The Barbary Corsairs remained an active threat until the early 1800s, preying on ships of the 
slave trade.  In opposition of the Barbary Corsairs were the Maltese Corsairs, instructed by the 
Christian Knights of St John to target Turkish (Muslim) vessels (Royal Naval Museum Library, 
2002). 
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 Pirate ships varied based on location.  Schooners, which extended very little below the 
water, were able to maneuver close to the coast.  These were commonly used by pirates along 
North America.  Galleys, which are long, narrow, and powered by slaves forced to row, were 
used by the Barbary Corsairs.  Pirates in Chinese territory used a type of ship called a junk, 
which were flat-bottomed boats held together by bamboo, often having three masts (Royal 
Naval Museum Library, 2002).  Pirates today have adapted modern boats, usually speedboats, 
by outfitting them with automatic weapons. 
  2.1.2  Famous pirates 
Sir Francis Drake was a privateer for England, famous for his 
successful attacks on Spanish galleons for the Queen Elizabeth I.  He 
eventually became mayor of Plymouth and earned a seat in the English 
Parliament.  Held as a hero by the English and as a villainous pirate by the 
Spanish, Drake nevertheless is recognized for his cunning as a naval 
commander (Britannia.com, 1999) 
Blackbeard, or Edward Teach, is possibly the most 
recognized pirate.  Another privateer, Blackbeard was authorized by 
the English Queen Anne to attack French and Spanish vessels during 
the War of Spanish Succession.  Named for his wild beard and hair, 
which he supposedly braided, Blackbeard used fear and 
intimidation to control his crew of approximately 250 pirates.  His 
lack of discretion when capturing ships and taking hostages is also 
famous; one story tells of hostages, including women and children, being ransomed for medical 
supplies (Kirkpatrick, 2008).  
He eventually settled in North Carolina, where he was forced to battle against Royal 
Navy sloops.  Killed by Lieutenant Robert Maynard, Blackbeard’s death was a symbol of the end 
of the Golden Age of Piracy (Royal Naval Museum Library, 2002). 
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Ching Shih was a female Chinese pirate.  She was 
not exceptional merely because of her gender – she 
supposedly commanded a fleet consisting of 80,000 pirates 
and 2,000 vessels.  Known for her strict code of conduct, 
she would harshly punish anyone who disobeyed her.  One 
crime, for which death was the penalty, was raping a 
female captive.  Her fleet would target not only merchant 
ships, but also villages along the coast.  She eventually was granted a pardon by the Chinese 
government, opened a brothel and gambling house, and died at the age of 60 (Vallar, 2008). 
 2.2  Modern Piracy 
Modern-day pirates threaten lives, commerce, and the environment as they target ships 
and crew transiting through international waters. The rising piracy in the Gulf of Aden not only 
poses a threat to global commerce, but also threatens aid delivery by the United Nations World 
Food Programme to Somalis.  Approximately 2.4 million Somalis depend on the shipments. 
After 2005, instances of piracy have risen.  Figure 1 illustrates the locations where pirate 
attacks occurred off the coast of Somalia, which has the highest number of attacks (CNN.com, 
2008).   
 
Figure 1:  Map of piracy cases off the coast of Somalia   
There is much speculation as to the causes for workers, often fishermen, to revert to piracy as a 
way of living.  One theory is that fishermen resorted to piracy after foreign fishing companies 
illegally depleted their territorial waters of fish.  Regardless, the recent cases of piracy have 
 5 
 
been alarmingly effective.  For example, American and Russian naval forces were the first 
stationed off the Somali coast to monitor the cargo ship carrying Ukrainian tanks that was 
seized by Somali pirates.  The Somali pirates demanded $20 million; two other cargo ships were 
also ransomed by the same pirates (NPR.org, 2008).   
The 22-ship Yemen Navy asked for aid from the US Navy in addressing the daily distress 
calls from pirate attacks.  Another account that occurred on August 21, 2008 was the capture of 
a German ship and crew; the pirates received $1 million in ransom (NPR.org, 2008).  A 
spokesman for the US Navy says that more than just the US and coalition forces are needed to 
combat the rise in piracy (NPR.org, 2008). 
The International Maritime Bureau reported a 10% increase in cases of piracy from 2006 
to 2007; Figure 2 charts the rise in Somali piracy over the past decade (International Maritime 
Bureau, 2009) while Figure 3 illustrates the number of attacks in the Northwestern Africa area 
(BBCnews.com, 2008) 
          
Figure 2:  Pirate attacks since '03 
Figure 3:  Map of Somali Pirate Attacks 
                  
The Malacca Straits are noted as a high-risk area; this is of concern to the international market.  
Japan especially is concerned because most of its oil supply is imported through the Malacca 
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Straits, making it a significant threat to the Japanese economy.  Malaysia is attempting to use 
intelligence on pirate activity to efficiently catch pirates (Brant, 2008). 
The international threat of piracy has been addressed by international forces – the EU 
sent a flotilla to aid in the fight.  The address of the piracy threat by these forces has been given 
the name Operation Atalanta (Reynolds, 2008).  The flotilla consisted of six warships and a few 
aircraft specializing in reconnaissance.  These forces replaced the NATO ships that were largely 
unsuccessful in stopping the increase in piracy attacks.  The NATO forces were officially relieved 
on December 15, 2008.  One major problem that the EU hoped to address is whether the EU 
flotilla will be allowed to take action and board pirate ships – warships from other countries 
(including the United States, India, Russia, and Malaysia) that patrol the waters board and 
search the suspected pirate vessels captured in international waters (International Herald 
Tribune, 2008). 
In 2008 alone, pirates collected about $150 million in ransom (Hunter, 2008).  With little 
more than a small boat, ladders or grappling hooks, and automatic weapons, fishermen-turned-
pirates are able to board vessels and hold crews and cargo hostage.  Interestingly, negotiations 
typically take place over satellite phone with the aid of a middle man, usually a trusted relative 
of one or more of the pirates.  Once the ransom is settled, the pirates arrange to have cash 
brought to a separate vessel.  After counting the money and even determining its authenticity, 
the pirates leave the captured vessel to be reclaimed by tugboats or the local navy.  The pirates 
then evenly distribute the ransom (Hunter, 2008). 
Merchant ships learned to defend themselves using nonlethal force.  Evasive maneuvers 
and the employment of a high-powered spray hose discourage pirates from boarding the ship.  
However, as international law enforcement increases in attempt to arrest pirates, the threat 
against ships seems greater than before.  In March of 2009, two vessels were seized in less than 
24 hours, reportedly with a larger-than-average pirate crew of 16 to 18 men.  In fact, March of 
2009 pirates attempted attacks nearly on a daily basis.  Maritime Intelligence speculates that 
because much of the international warships are concentrated in the Gulf of Aden, those 
commercial ships traveling along the Indian Ocean part of the Somali coastline have been more 
frequently (and successfully) targeted (Lekic, 2009). 
 7 
 
2.2.1 Punishment for pirates 
 Pirates are arrested when they are caught in international waters.  At the end of 2008, 
the US Navy arrested several pirates, killing two in the process.  Those that were arrested stood 
trial in Kenya.  Pirates captured by international forces are sent to stand trial in Kenya due to a 
dangerous Somali judicial system that could dole out harsh sentences; many pirates are minors 
(BBCnews.com, 2008).   Further political developments allowed for the international law 
enforcement to stop, search, and seize any small vessels suspected of piracy, regardless of 
whether or not they are in Somalia’s territorial waters. 
 The only land-based law enforcement present in Somalia, where piracy is thriving most, 
is Somali forces.  This “army” is comprised of young soldiers that are often under the command 
of someone linked to piracy.  Unfortunately, land-based UN peacekeeping forces were as 
ineffective as those at sea, partially due to the government that did not seem to have any 
incentive to stop piracy because it is a lucrative business – the former president of Somalia, 
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, never gave any indication that he would cooperate with the anti-piracy 
coalition (Reynolds, 2008). 
 There is new hope that the piracy that has consumed Somalia will be coming to an end.  
President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who was president before US-backed troops from 
Ethiopia forced him out of office, was re-elected in early 2009.  With no justice system, Somalia 
will need the aid of international forces to establish law; President Ahmed has shown 
willingness to work with the Obama Administration and the US government in effort to stop 
piracy.  A key aspect of the change in government that may provide results is that President 
Ahmed has stated he will not accept bribes from pirates, as the former president did.  Ahmed 
hopes to eventually establish a justice system that will be upheld by a national police force 
(Setrakian & Hughes, 2009).  Until a justice system and police force are established, Somalia will 
continue to rely on allies for the capture, detainment, prosecution, and punishment of pirates. 
2.3  Somalia:  the source of the greatest modern piracy threats 
   2.3.1  General Information 
Somalia is located on the Horn of Africa; it has extensive coastline (about 1,880 miles) 
along a highly utilized shipping route.  The Gulf of Aden is along the northern coastline and the 
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Indian Ocean is along its eastern coast.  With extensive coastline, Somalia is able to have many 
port cities.  Its capital city Mogadishu is on the coast of the Indian Ocean.  Figure 4 is a map of 
Somalia (mdgmonitor.org, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 4:  Map of Somalia 
 Roughly the size of the state of Texas, Somalia has a desert climate that has monsoons 
in the southern regions.  Due to the rainfall in the south, as well as the two rivers Shabelle and 
Juba, farmers are able to grow crops most of the year.  However, droughts, dust storms, and 
flooding are common natural hazards.  Desertification is also a problem, as is the lack of fresh 
water.  Farmers often allow livestock to overgraze, leading to soil erosion.  Less than 2% of 
Somalia is used for agriculture (CIA WorldFactBook, 2009). 
 Although the majority of Somalis are farmers, the country suffers from famine.  The 
estimated population is 8.7 million (mdgmonitor.org, 2009); its largest city Mogadishu has an 
estimated population of 2 million.  An estimated 1.4 million Somalis are threatened by drought 
and hunger (Bryden, 2006).  The UN has been working to alleviate the famine; the UN’s 
Millennium Campaign, which seeks to halve global poverty by 2015, is being applied in Somalia.  
This campaign outlines 8 goals (UN.org, 2009):   
1. End poverty and hunger 
2. Establish universal education 
3. Promote gender equality 
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4. Promote child health 
5. Promote maternal health 
6. Combat the spread of HIV/AIDS 
7. Promote environmental sustainability 
8. Create a global partnership 
 
These goals have been given equal priority for implementation in Somalia.  Less than 9% of the 
population receives primary education.  The average lifespan of a Somali is only 45.9 years; the 
median age of the population is about 18 years old.  Somali women experience some of the 
highest rates of maternal mortality in the world; the infant mortality rate is also high compared 
to first-world nations (UN.org, 2009). 
 The spread of HIV/AIDS, which is a major problem for many other African nations, is not 
as prominent in Somalia.  The major health problems concern fresh water, and the lack of its 
availability.  Somalis are at high risk of contracting water borne diseases, including hepatitis A 
and E and schistosomiasis.  Only 29% of the total population has access to improved drinking 
water (UN.org, 2009). 
 January 31st 2009, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected President of Somalia by 
Somali Parliament.  The President preceding him was suspected of being corrupt, and was 
profoundly against Western aid and influence.  President Ahmed is the opposite; upon being 
declared the new leader of Somalia, he vowed to bring peace.  After an Osama bin Laden tape, 
released in March of 2009, encouraged citizens to overthrow the new pro-Western 
government, Ahmed denounced the al-Qaida terrorist organization (Nor, 2009). 
 Somalia has no official military.  Were it to raise an army, over one million of its male 
citizens would be within the general age range for military service.  The President of Somalia 
has declared that he wishes to start a police force to focus on arresting anyone linked to piracy, 
as well as establishing a legal system.  Islamic law has been implemented in many regions to 
provide conflict resolution.  Currently, the largest barrier to creating a police force and justice 
system is that the government has no funds with which to establish them.  As discussed in the 
next section, the economic status of Somalia makes it one of the poorest nations in the world. 
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2.3.2  Economy 
 Somalia’s economy is mostly dependent on agriculture and livestock.  Nomads raise 
livestock, which accounts for about 40% of Gross Domestic Product.  The chief exports are 
livestock, hides, fish, charcoal, and bananas; the main imports are sugar, sorghum, corn, qat, 
and machined goods.  Somalia used to have an industrial sector, but factories were looted for 
metal parts.  Surprisingly, telecommunications are successful, especially in Mogadishu.  Somalia 
has the lowest rates for international calls on the African continent. 
 Africa is now seeking a “stimulus package” from the G-20 nations (Group of Twenty 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors).  Somalia’s estimated Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), or the value of how much foreign aid the nation receives, was $392 billion for 
2006 (unicef.org, 2009). 
 While the average male in Somalia has work, the females typically raise children (the 
average number of children per woman is 6).  With the average yearly earnings per person 
below $600 per year, many Somalis live in poverty.  Many have turned to a life of crime, as 
brought to light by international media when Somali fishermen choose to become pirates, 
taking ships hostage for ransom.  When confronted about their choice to become a pirate, 
many cite poverty as a motivation. 
Somalia is an impoverished nation that suffers not only from famine and natural 
disasters, but also from poor, corrupt leadership.  The history of the country is filled with 
oppression, violence, and poverty.  With the aid of Western nations and the support of a new 
government, Somalia can rise out of its current state and become a self-sufficient nation.  
Piracy is a key barrier to Somalia becoming peaceful; it also impedes trade between nations. 
2.4  US Navy policy toward piracy 
 One of the main missions of the Navy is to protect sea commerce; for this reason, 
fighting piracy has become a priority.  Several naval warships are tasked to patrol the 
international waters off of Somalia, at least 12 nautical miles away from the coast.  The actual 
numbers of ships deployed in the region changes frequently, but are assigned from the Fifth 
Fleet.  Fleets in the US Navy operate in designated areas – Fifth Fleet is assigned the Horn of 
Africa, as well as the Straits of Hormuz, Persian Sea, and Red Sea.  The US Navy is working with 
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ships from 20 other nations, and has assigned the Cruiser USS VELLA GULF to act as flagship, 
coordinating patrols.  The Combined Maritime Force, or CMF, works to promote maritime 
security not only for commercial vessels transiting the area, but also for local Somali fishermen.  
Using “approach and assist” tactics, the international forces have been promoting friendly 
relations with locals (Schaeffer, 2009). 
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, stated on February 12, 2008: 
The presence of our forces and coalition forces in the Gulf are enabling and 
allowing the flow of that very important commerce that takes place -- the energy 
resources coming out, the goods that are going in.  And it's that naval force, the 
coalition naval force, that's there that is guaranteeing that free flow and the 
safety and security of those very precious commodities.  That's what navies do.  
And the fact that we're operating in concert with our friends in the region and 
other nations who contribute to that coalition speaks to the essence of our 
maritime strategy, which is one of cooperation and collaboration. 
 
The US Navy has been tasked with detaining captured pirates until they can be received by 
Kenya for prosecution.  This will be in effect until the Somali government has established a 
justice system.  As of February 12, 2009, the US Navy has 16 suspected pirates in custody.  
Naval vessels are allowed to search and board suspected pirate boats if they are in international 
waters – once the pirates enter Somali territorial waters, the Navy would need permission for 
pursuit.  The Obama Administration declared that pirates need to experience law enforcement, 
and want to ensure that pirates are not simply detained and released (Lowe, 2009).  Kenya has 
provided detainment facilities and temporarily allows Somali pirates to pass through their 
judicial system.  
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
3.1  Introduction to System Dynamics 
System Dynamics was created by Jay Forrester in the 1950s while teaching at MIT 
(Sterman, 2000).  The purpose of System Dynamics is to visually map a specific problem in a 
system.  Systems can be anything from a small business to the global economy, or the Amazon 
rainforest in Brazil.  An important lesson to remember about system dynamics is that problems 
must be modeled, not simply a system.  For example, deforestation in the rainforest would be a 
problem within the system of Brazil’s economy, or within the logging market. 
The models are made up of three key components:  stocks, flows, and variables.  A 
common analogy is a bathtub filling and draining water:  the bathtub is a stock; the faucet is a 
flow (in).  A drain would be another flow (out).  Variables affect the flows – an example would 
be a growing clog in the drain, which would act as a delay on the outflow of water from the 
bathtub.   Figure 5 (Sterman, 2000) is an illustration of the bathtub analogy. 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Bathtub Analogy 
Figure 5:  Bathtub Analogy 
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A group of stocks, flows, and variables can form feedback loops.  Loops are a 
fundamental part of system dynamics.  Loops are typically assigned a positive or negative 
polarity to indicate growth pattern.  Positive feedback loops generate growth; negative 
feedback loops generate balance and equilibrium (Sterman, 2000).  Models are built with a goal 
in mind, and typically this goal will be addressed by altering or adding various policies.  For 
example, a model of the Amazon rainforest deforestation problem could illustrate policy 
makers’ goal of slowing the rate of tree loss through a tough government policy restricting 
loggers. 
The polarity of feedback loops determines the pattern or mode of the loop behavior.  
There are three basic modes:  exponential growth (positive loop), goal seeking (negative loop), 
and oscillating (negative loop with delays) (Sterman, 2000).  Delays are made with variables 
that affect flows.  
It is also important to recognize the limitations of system dynamic modeling.  
Constructed based on reality, there is always a limit on accuracy.  Models can only be detailed 
to a certain extent; too much detail may detract from the overall problem.  It is vital to remain 
focused on a problem when building a system dynamics model. 
 
  
 14 
 
Chapter 4:  A Model of Piracy 
 
4.1  Beginning with the Farmer-Bandit Model 
Models can be very simple, with one stock, or complex and extensive, containing dozens 
of stocks and variables.  Models are an illustration of problems, made for the purpose of finding 
the best solution.  The model constructed for this MQP used another model, the Farmer-Bandit 
Model, as a basis for design. 
Suppose there are a number of farmers that are just beginning to experience some 
difficulty in profiting off their work.  A few of these farmers choose to turn to a life of crime, 
becoming bandits, who rob the farmers.  This increases the difficulty for the farmers – causing 
more farmers to choose to become bandits.  In the meantime, as the number of bandits grows, 
the government takes action by using soldiers to suppress the bandits.  The supply of soldiers 
comes from the stock of farmers.  As the number of farmers decreases (which it does more 
rapidly as the number taken to become soldiers rises) the difficulty of farming rises as well.  
However, the amount of soldiers begins to have an effect on the crime and the number of 
bandits decreases.  The bandits revert back to farmers, resulting in a lessening need for 
soldiers.  Soldiers become farmers again, and the model returns to its original state.  Figure 6 is 
a causal loop diagram illustrating the relationships between key variables in the Farmer-Bandit 
model. 
 
Figure 6:  Causal Loop Diagram for Farmer-Bandit model 
Farmers
Soldiers Bandits
- -
-
+
--
Economic well-being
of farmers --
+
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To adapt this model to fit the current global problem presented by piracy, several 
aspects will need to be altered.  First, it is important to note that pirates do not loot fisherman, 
as bandits do farmers in the original model.  Piracy earns profits in the millions of dollars by 
ransoming ships and hostages.  Another key difference is that the External Law Enforcement 
variable increases, but does not directly affect the number of fishermen; there is a separate 
stock of Police that draws from the Fisherman stock. 
The relationship between the key variables included in the system dynamics model is 
displayed in the causal loop diagram, Figure 7, below. 
 
Figure 7:  CLD of Pirate Fisherman Model 
There are three negative loops:  Piracy Earnings, Police Capture, and Police Effect.  The Piracy 
Earnings loop shows the relationship between pirate earnings, pirates, police, and police threat.  
As  pirate earnings increases, it increases the number of pirates; the number of police responds 
to this increase by also increasing (and is supported by external enforcement), which raises the 
police threat.  The police threat decreases pirate earnings, effectively showing how the 
Pirate Earnings
PiratesCaptives
Police Threat
External Law
Enforcement
Police
+
-
-
+
+
-
+
+
Police Capture Loop
Piracy Earnings Loop
Police Effect Loop
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establishment of a police force will decrease pirates through decreasing the potential earnings.  
The Police Capture loop illustrates how the police force will reduce pirates by increasing the 
number of captive pirates (captives).  As the number of police increases, the number of captives 
will increase, decreasing the number of pirates.  The third loop, Police Effect, shows the simple 
effect police have on pirate earnings:  as the number of pirates increases, the amount of pirate 
earnings (per pirate) decreases. 
 4.2  The Pirate Fisherman Model 
 The problem that the Pirate Fisherman Model addresses is determining what policy may 
best work to end piracy off of the country of Somalia.  The model is divided into sectors, and 
incorporates the relationships between pirates, fishermen, (internal) police, and external law 
enforcement.  
Figure 8 shows the entire model, which is divided into sectors:  Police, Police Supply, 
Police Demand, Fisherman, Pirate, Pirate Attractiveness, Captivity, and Initial Sectors. 
 
Figure 8:  The Pirate Fisherman Model 
The next sections will explain the details of each sector. 
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4.2.1  Police Sector 
The Police Sector shows the process of fishermen becoming police.  There is a brief 
Police Adjustment Delay, to imitate the need for training time before police are deployed.  
Desired Additional Domestic police increases the rate.  External Enforcement, a switch that is 
activated to simulate the presence of international forces, will decrease the Desired Additional 
Domestic Police.  Figure 9 is an image of the Police Sector. 
 
Figure 9:  Police Sector 
4.2.2  Police Supply Sector 
The Police Supply sector includes the variables that affect the flow between the 
fishermen and police stocks.  The Average Earnings per Fisherman and Average Police Earnings 
affect how attractive it is to become a policeman.  The Ratio of Fishermen Seeking Police 
Employment is the number of fishermen that want to become police (based on desired 
additional police) and is a graph of predicted behavior.  Figure 10 is an image of the Police 
Supply Sector. 
 
Figure 10:  Police Supply Sector 
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4.2.3  Police Demand Sector 
The Police Demand Sector contains several important variables.  The Marginal Efficiency 
of Police represents how successful (or unsuccessful) police are in capturing and arresting 
pirates.  Desired Additional Police is the number of police needed to fight a rise in piracy 
represented by Excess Pirates.  Lawlessness is the attitude of the Total Population – whether or 
not Somalis accept pirates or would rather not have any pirates.  If Lawlessness is high but 
Acceptable Lawlessness (a switch) is off, then desired additional police will contribute to a 
larger police force.  Figure 11 is an image of the Police Demand Sector. 
 
Figure 11:  Police Demand Sector 
4.2.4  Fisherman Sector 
Fishermen is the stock that Pirates and Police draws from.  Because there are biflows, or 
a two-way flow, between these stocks, it is possible for pirates and police to return to being 
fishermen.  Figure 12 is an image of the Fisherman Sector. 
 
Figure 12:  Fisherman Sector 
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4.2.5  Pirate Sector 
The Pirate Sector shows the basic flow to and from Pirates, with an adjustment time 
that acts as a delay.  This delay is to represent the time needed for fishermen to convert to 
pirates, or vice versa.  Figure 13 is an image of the Pirate Sector. 
 
Figure 13:  Pirate Sector 
4.2.6  Pirate Attractiveness Sector 
The Pirate Attractiveness Sector shows the variables that impact the flow between 
fishermen and pirates.  When Pirate Attractiveness is high, fishermen will become pirates 
faster.  The Marginal Effectiveness of Police, both domestic and external, increase Police Threat 
as they increase.  Pirate Chance of Failure affects Pirate Chance of Success, which in turn affects 
Expected Pirate Payoff.  Potential Pirate Earnings will decrease as the number of pirates rises, 
because the share each pirate will receive will be smaller.  Expected Pirate Payoff and Potential 
Earnings per Pirate are important variables, because they increase or decrease Pirate 
Attractiveness.  Figure 14 is an image of the Pirate Attractiveness Sector. 
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Figure 14:  Pirate Attractiveness Sector 
4.2.7  Captivity Sector 
The Captivity Sector depicts the process captured pirates undergo. Captured pirates can 
be rehabilitated and return to being fishermen, or they are released and return to being pirates.  
For each of these rates at which people leave the Captured Pirates stock, there are delays that 
represent a rehabilitation process or jail time.  Figure 15 is an image of the Captivity Sector. 
 
Figure 15:  Captivity Sector 
4.2.8  Initial Sector  
 The initial values represent the starting values for each of the stocks.  These values were 
estimations of the current situation and population in Somalia – some fishermen and pirates, 
but no police.  Figure 16 is an image of the Initial Sector. 
 21 
 
 
Figure 16:  Initial Sector 
The second part of this chapter is organized according to the standard method modeling 
process to describe and explain the model built to solve to Somali piracy problem.  The 
standard method is a modeling development procedure that, like the scientific method for 
scientists, aids in successful modeling (Sterman, 2000).  It clearly outlines the steps required to 
develop the model, as well as the policies that the model will test.  When one step of the 
process is not met, the modeler must remain at that stage and address the problems.  This way, 
after the process is complete evaluating the effects of the policies, a sound recommendation 
can be made. 
4.3  Problem Articulation 
The first step of the modeling process, the problem articulation poses a question that 
can be resolved by policy.  It is vital that models are built with a problem in mind, rather than 
imitating a system.  Also important (especially for the scope of this project) is that the problem 
the model is a simplification of the problem the model hopes to address.  This section discusses 
the thorough development of the ideas the model is built to encompass. 
4.3.1  Theme selection 
The theme of the model will be to evaluate various policies that will reduce or end the 
amount of pirate attacks.  Piracy has proven to be a problem worthy of international 
interference, costing organizations millions of dollars.  Finding a solution to this problem, 
whether it is the least expensive or fastest to produce results, would be in the interest of 
dozens of nations whose commercial shipping has been impeded, and whose naval forces are 
deployed in effort to stop piracy.  In general, it is also a humanitarian mission to end the 
poverty in Somalia, which drives so many Somalis to convert to pirates.  
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 4.3.2  Key variables 
There are several variables in the Pirate Fisherman Model that largely affect the others.  
These are Pirates, Pirate Attractiveness, Police, and Desired Police.  The Pirates stock is 
important because it symbolizes the core problem the model is attempting to solve.  Pirate 
attractiveness is key because it has a huge impact on the number of pirates.  Finally, the 
number of police and the desired police impact are key because they counter the amount of 
pirates and pirate attractiveness.  The absence of any of these variables would make the model 
useless; policy testing would also be impossible.   
4.3.3  Time horizon 
The time horizon is the length of time over which the simulation will run to test the 
policy.  The time horizon for the Pirate Fisherman Model is five years.  This should give ample 
time for the policies and delayed effects to impact the results.  Also, it is realistic for a third 
world country to need at least that amount of time for a police force to be created; this may 
require less time with external aid.  
4.3.4  Reference Modes 
The reference modes are predictions of the behaviors for the key variables.  These will 
be referred to during simulations, to compare the expected behavior to the behavior that policy 
change affects.  Figure 17 shows the expected relationship between the desired police and 
pirate attractiveness.  As the number of police rises, pirate attractiveness decreases; as the 
number of pirates rises, the desired police rise also. 
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Figure 17:  Reference mode for Police and Pirates 
Figure 18 shows the expeceted behavior of the Police stock over time.  Due to the number of 
pirates, police are recruited.  After a delay, the number of police goes up and continues to rise 
until the number of pirates decreases. 
 
Figure 18:  Reference mode for Police 
 24 
 
Figure 19 is the reference mode for Pirates.  As recent events have shown, the number 
of pirates increases, but decreases to a reasonable level over time.  This is due to External law 
enforcement, domestic police, or both. 
 
Figure 19:  Reference mode for Pirates 
 
While the previous reference modes have been for predicted variable behavior, the following 
reference modes (shown in Figure 20) for pirates and police show the desired and feared 
effects. 
 
Figure 20:  Desired and Feared reference modes for Police and Pirates 
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With time, the hope is that the amount of pirates will decrease; the fear is that they will 
continue operating at their peak level.  The hope for police is that Somalia will eventually 
employ some; the fear is that a police force will never develop. 
4.4  Formulation of Dynamic Hypothesis 
The Dynamic Hypothesis is defined as “a working theory of how the problem arose” 
(Sterman, 2000).  The dynamic hypothesis simplifies the complex relationship between the 
economic variables that cause the problem that the Pirate Fisherman model illustrates.  It is 
also a simplification of the global political agenda. 
The economic condition of the population is attributed with the reason fishermen desire 
to become pirates.  This hypothesis is represented in the model by the variables for pirate 
payoff (or income):  expected pirate payoff and potential earnings per pirate.  As discussed in 
section 2.3.2, Somalia’s economy is in poor condition, with much of the nation’s population 
living below the poverty line. 
 
  4.4.1  Initial hypothesis generation – an Endogenous focus 
The crises that Somalia is experiencing (droughts alternating with floods, famine, 
extreme poverty, disease) are an obvious source for the motivation for a fisherman to become 
a pirate.  Research into Somali history shows that the nation has suffered through many wars, 
often producing tens of thousands of refugees.  One journalist who covered Somalia for 17 
years, wrote (Hartley, 2008):   
The pirate gangs, it turns out, are organized by ex-fishermen who got very 
annoyed by the way international boats poached Somalia’s rich tuna-fishing 
grounds and dumped toxic waste along its ungoverned shores.  In the early days 
they demanded poachers pay fines, but later they realized there was more 
money to be made from straightforward abductions.  Today the gangs recruit 
ordinary youths.  Most rank-and-file pirates cannot even swim.  Their only 
required skill is to shoot straight.  These youths usually participate only in a 
couple of operations, hoping to make enough money to get asylum in the West. 
 
Along with the threat of poverty, poor government and the lack of a police force contributed to 
the lawlessness that allowed pirates to thrive.  These explanations for what caused the piracy 
problem to develop are all internal factors – contributors that arose within Somalia, not from 
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outside factors.  Internal causes are called endogenous.  The hypotheses for the Pirate 
Fisherman Model involve mostly endogenous causes; the policies to be tested reflect this. 
  4.4.2 Mapping 
 A model boundary chart summarizes and categorizes the key variables of the model, 
and provides an easy way to determine the scope of the model.  Table 1 lists key variables 
under three categories.  Endogenous indicates that the variable is controllable to an extent; 
exogenous variables are those outside the control of the model.  Excluded variables are 
important aspects that are not included in the scope of the model.  
Table 1:  Pirate Fisherman Model Boundary Chart 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Fishermen External Law Enforcement Government budget 
Pirates Fisherman Earnings  
Police Average Goods Traffic  
Expected Pirate Payoff Marginal Police Effectiveness  
Captured Pirates   
 
4.5  Formulation of a Simulation Model 
The Pirate Fisherman Model was formulated to answer the question of which policy 
would best address the current piracy problem off the coast of Somalia.   
  4.5.1  Specification 
The structure of the model was intended to be as simple as possible, while including the 
key variables that affect maritime piracy.  Dividing the model into sectors helped unnecessary 
variables to be identified and removed.  As the model grew in size and complexity, it was 
important to remain focused on the scope of the project. 
  4.5.2  Estimations 
Little data about Somalia is reliable, if in existence at all.  Some variables required 
estimations, including Average Fisherman Earnings.  This value, $650 was chosen because it is 
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the average annual earning of a Somali worker (in dollars).  The initial value for pirates was also 
estimated, because there was no data available.  There was very little data about how effective 
pirates are on average, other than reports confirming that another ship had been captured.  For 
this reason, many of the variables were designed as ratios. 
  4.5.3  Focus and Boundary 
 The focus of the model proved to act as guidance.  The overall behavior of the model 
was designed to imitate what has occurred in Somalia, and what can realistically be expected.  
For example, if the general population discourages lawlessness, it will affect the number of 
desired police for internal law enforcement.  On the other hand, if the general population 
promotes lawlessness, there will be fewer fishermen that convert to police.  The model was 
designed to incorporate these aspects; there are political constraints as well as limitations on 
foreign influence.  
4.6  Testing the Model 
 Testing is important to ensure that the model is as accurate as possible; because models 
are mere simplifications of a problem, there will always be some limitations on accuracy.  The 
testing procedures are to ensure that the model behavior is normal and imitates the real world 
to the best of its ability.  The following tests were applied to assess the Pirate Fisherman Model: 
1. Boundary Adequacy 
2. Structure Assessment 
3. Dimensional Consistency 
4. Parameter Assessment 
5. Extreme Conditions 
6. Integration Error 
7. Behavior Reproduction 
8. Behavior Anomaly 
9. Surprise Behavior 
 
All of the tests produced predicted results; any errors were quickly corrected.  The Pirate 
Fisherman Model resembles the current crisis in Somalia, taking into account economic and 
social aspects. 
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4.6.1  Comparison to reference modes 
The most important adjustable variables behaved as predicted, showing that the model 
accurately (as possible) replicates the situation.  The Pirates stock fluctuated predictably based 
on other variables, including average pirate earnings and internal and external law 
enforcement.  The External law enforcement variable behaved normally, diminishing according 
to the number of pirates.  Pirate risk was also predictable; it rose as internal and external law 
enforcement and police rose, and diminished as the number of pirates increased.  Lawlessness 
behaved predictably and positively impacted the police recruitment when it was generally 
discouraged by the overall population; this variable may prove inaccurate should the new 
Somali leadership be overthrown or become corrupt. 
4.6.2  Robustness 
The constant variables in the model were found to be robust, and behave predictably.  
To test the robustness, “extreme conditions” were used.  This means that drastic values were 
used to simulate an unrealistic situation to ensure that the model performs in the same 
(correct) manner as it would were the conditions “normal.”   For example, would the Pirate 
stock behave as it should if the pirate rewards were extremely low or high?  All of the variables 
passed the robustness test and behaved predictably. 
An important test for modeling is unit checking.  For the Pirate Fisherman Model, the 
units utilized were months, people, people per month, and US dollars per month.  After much 
reworking, the model passed the units test. 
  4.6.3  Sensitivity 
Sensitivity analysis consists of testing the model’s behavior given uncertainty in 
parameters, initial conditions, model boundaries, and aggregations (Sterman, 2000).  The Pirate 
Fisherman Model deals with some uncertainties, such as whether or not the government will be 
able to raise a police force, or how long the External Law Enforcement will remain.  This may 
restrict the applicability of the policies.  There were few other uncertainties; numerical 
information about Somalia and the forces fighting piracy was attainable. 
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4.7  Policy Design and Evaluation 
As discussed in previous sections, the status of Somalia is poor.  The main speculation is 
that fishermen choose a life of piracy to escape from poverty.  Even if this is the case, the 
situation has spiraled out of control – ships carrying UN aid to Somalia and Kenya have been 
taken hostage, preventing food relief from being delivered to people in need.  The fact that 
Somali pirates threaten lives (by carrying weapons and forcefully taking hostages) and resist law 
enforcement efforts is another sign that an effective policy to stop pirates is necessary.   These 
policies applied to the Pirate Fisherman Model have few possible negative outcomes, but are 
feasible. 
The four policies the Pirate Fisherman Model tests are discussed in detail in the 
following four sections. 
  4.7.1  Policy 1:  Increasing External Law Enforcement 
The first policy of increasing External Law Enforcement would only negatively affect the 
pirates; it is outside the scope of the model to predict other effects, such as fish populations 
leaving the coastal area due to all the ship traffic.  However, there is the risk that with a 
continual presence of external law enforcement, Somalia will not desire to become self-
sufficient.  This policy would also be expensive for the nations that deploy warships to the area; 
however, it is a feasible course of action for the international community. 
4.7.2  Policy 2:  Create a Somali police force 
The second policy could backfire were the police force to become corrupt.  Positive 
effects would be the creation of jobs and the upholding of law (and the elimination of piracy).  
The successful implementation of this policy would also lead to Somalia becoming self-
sufficient; it would require a solid government and infrastructure, and will have high initial 
startup costs.  A key factor that has allowed pirates to flourish is that once on land, they cannot 
be pursued by naval forces.  A Somali police force would prevent pirates from seeking haven on 
land. 
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4.7.3  Policy 3:  Adjust fisherman income 
The third policy could have the intended result of reducing or eliminating pirate 
attractiveness, or could have no effect other than reducing the number of fishermen willing to 
convert to police.  A less obvious method of implementing this policy would be to ensure that 
international commercial fishing vessels do not fish in Somali waters.  Somali fishermen were 
essentially driven to piracy due to the depletion of the fish population.  By preventing foreign 
vessels from illegally fishing in Somali waters, the local fishermen would have a chance at 
profiting from fishing. 
4.7.4  Policy 4:  Decrease pirate payoff 
The fourth policy, which requires that nations do not pay ransom for captured ships, 
could result in hostages being killed, or the decline of pirate attractiveness and potential 
earnings per pirate.  This policy would be the most difficult to implement, because it would 
require the participation of every nation that is demanded to pay ransom.  This would pose a 
risk to the hostages, because they would be at the mercy of pirates that are faced with 
receiving no ransom. 
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Chapter 5:  Simulations 
 
 Simulations were run to test the four main policies that may bring an end to piracy off 
the coast of Somalia.  These simulations were conducted by changing the values for the 
variables that represent the policy change.   
5.1  Simulations for Policy 1 
For the first policy, an increase the amount of external law enforcement (such as US 
Navy ships) to capture and arrest pirates, the variable External Law Enforcement was changed 
to a high value.  The result was an eventual drop in piracy – which caused the External Law 
Enforcement to drop in response.  Basically, flooding the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden with 
naval warships would be effective in the short run, but would not result in the elimination of 
piracy in Somalia.  Figure 21 shows the drop in pirate population caused by the presence of 
external law enforcement. 
 
 
Figure 21:  Policy 1 simulation result – Pirate Population 
This policy also resulted in a large number of captives.  This would be problematic for Somalia, 
which has no judicial system or facilities in which to jail captured pirates; Kenya would have to 
shoulder the burden.  Figure 22 shows the number of captives when Policy 1 was simulated. 
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Figure 22:  Policy 1 simulation result – Captured Pirates 
 
5.2  Simulations for Policy 2 
The second policy, the creation of a Somali police force that can arrest pirates, was far 
more effective in the long run.  Once a police force was established (and rose with respect to 
the number of pirates), piracy diminished.  While there were oscillations, the effectiveness of 
an internal police force was higher than that of an external force, especially over a long period 
of time.  The number of police and pirates oscillated with respect to each other.  Figure 23 
shows the oscillating reaction of pirates. 
 
Figure 23:  Policy 2 simulation result – Pirate Population 
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Overall, this policy made the economy of Somalia better off, promoted self-sufficiency and the 
creation of jobs, and had fewer captives.  The level of captives from Policy 2 is shown in Figure 
24; Figure 25 shows the leveling-off of police, indicating the creation of a new job market for 
Somalis. 
 
Figure 24:  Policy 2 simulation result – Captured Pirates 
 
Figure 25:  Policy 2 simulation result – Police Population 
 
5.3  Simulations for Policy 3 
The third policy, adjustment of fisherman income, contributed to the diminishing of 
pirates.  The effect of this policy was that fewer fishermen were tempted to become pirates; it 
must be noted that expected pirate payoff is affected by the potential earnings for pirates as 
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well as the chance of success.  The implementation of this policy would require the 
international community to fund the protection of Somali waters for fishermen, rather than 
funding the continuation of pirate hunting.  Figure 26 shows the diminishing of pirates to a low 
number over time. 
 
 
Figure 26:  Policy 3 simulation result – Pirate Population 
 
5.4  Simulations for Policy 4  
The fourth policy, making pirate payoff less by demanding nations never pay ransoms, 
was also effective.  After a short period of time, much of the pirates converted back to 
fishermen.  This policy directly affected the piracy adjustment, resulting in a low number of 
remaining pirates.  Figure 27 shows that the number of pirates diminishes (to a lower number 
than policy 3), due to reduced pirate payoff. 
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Figure 27:  Policy 4 simulation result – Pirate Population 
 
The combination of all four policies had a very interesting outcome:  due to the 
overwhelming presence of External Law Enforcement, the internal Police force never 
developed.  This indicates that if the international community maintains a large fleet of navy 
ships in the area, Somalia’s government may not feel as strong a need to establish a police 
force.  This would result in the resurgence of piracy, should the External Law Enforcement 
leave.  However, with the implementation of an internal police force, piracy would be 
eliminated. 
The expected results of all the policies are to reduce the number of pirates to zero.  
With a combination of more than one, or even all of, the policies, piracy will definitely be 
eliminated.  However, the flood of External Law Enforcement may have an adverse effect on 
Domestic Police, because there will be no desired domestic police if External Law Enforcement 
captures most of the pirates – there would be no need for domestic police.  The next chapter 
discusses the impacts of these simulation results, and which policies would be most effective 
and applicable. 
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Chapter 6:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 The simulation results present several options for the global community.  First, it would 
be possible to ensure safe shipping (in the short term) along the horn of Africa by increasing 
External Law Enforcement.  This would be costly for all nations that deploy ships to the Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, and therefore not very feasible for the long term.  For this reason, 
the recommendation is that international forces maintain a presence (and possibly increase in 
strength if piracy continues to rise) until a land-based Somali law enforcement is created and 
operational. 
 The second policy is key.  The simulations determined that without an internal police 
force, piracy will always rise to become an international problem.  For Somalia to become a 
self-sustaining nation, a judicial system (complete with the ability to capture and arrest pirates 
on land) is necessary.  Creating this force will most likely require international monetary aid, 
and possibly a coalition of international forces based on land.  Despite this, the main 
recommendation is that Somalia develops a police force that employs citizens to arrest pirates.  
Not only will this reduce the level of acceptable lawlessness, but it will also improve the 
economy by providing work.  Without the threat of piracy, international aid will be deliverable, 
helping the millions of Somalis that depend on it.  An internal police force would be most 
effective over the long term – making it the most recommended policy that this project 
evaluated. 
 The third policy is would also require monetary aid.  With much of the population living 
below the poverty line, increasing fisherman income through national means is impossible.  
However, this policy in conjunction with the creation of an internal police force would 
encourage fisherman to continue being lawful, eventually leading to the reduction of 
attractiveness of being a pirate.  This policy, while effective, would be dependent on the 
generosity of advanced nations. 
 The fourth policy was very effective, but may be considered infeasible.  Reducing Pirate 
payoff due to refusal to pay ransoms caused pirate attractiveness to decrease drastically – 
however, the model does not account for the potential violent reactions of the pirates to this 
policy.  Threats against captured crews’ lives may be carried through to pressure companies 
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into paying ransoms.  For this reason, this policy is not highly recommended, despite its 
effectiveness in the simulations. 
6.1  Future work 
 The main recommendation, the establishment of a Somali police force, potentially 
involves land-based forces from the international community.  Work for future projects could 
incorporate this aspect.  Also, until the threat of piracy is eliminated, the model can be adapted 
to detail other economic, political, and social aspects that the Pirate Fisherman model was 
unable to include in its scope. 
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Appendices 
 
1.   Model Equations 
 
Captured_Pirate(t) = Captured_Pirate(t - dt) + (Capture - Rehabilitation) * dt 
INIT Captured_Pirate = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Capture = (Pirates*Covered_Pirate_Ratio)/Time_to_Capture 
OUTFLOWS: 
Rehabilitation = Captured_Pirate/Average_Captivity_Time 
Fishermen(t) = Fishermen(t - dt) + (Rehabilitation - Piracy_Adjustment - Police_Adjustment) * dt 
INIT Fishermen = Initial_Fisherman 
INFLOWS: 
Rehabilitation = Captured_Pirate/Average_Captivity_Time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Piracy_Adjustment = ( (Fishermen*Pirate_Attractiveness) - (Pirates/Pirate_Attractiveness) ) / 
Pirate_Adjustment_Time 
Police_Adjustment = ( MIN(Desired_Additional_Domestic_Police, 
Fishermen_Seeking_Police_Employment)/Police_Adjustment_Delay ) 
Pirates(t) = Pirates(t - dt) + (Piracy_Adjustment - Capture) * dt 
INIT Pirates = Initial_Pirates 
INFLOWS: 
Piracy_Adjustment = ( (Fishermen*Pirate_Attractiveness) - (Pirates/Pirate_Attractiveness) ) / 
Pirate_Adjustment_Time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Capture = (Pirates*Covered_Pirate_Ratio)/Time_to_Capture 
Police(t) = Police(t - dt) + (Police_Adjustment) * dt 
INIT Police = Initial_Police 
INFLOWS: 
Police_Adjustment = ( MIN(Desired_Additional_Domestic_Police, 
Fishermen_Seeking_Police_Employment)/Police_Adjustment_Delay ) 
Acceptable_Lawlessness = 1 
Average_Captivity_Time = 24 
Average_Earnings_Per_Fisherman = 230 
Average_Goods_Traffic = 1000000 
Average_Police_Earnings = 250 
Covered_Pirate_Ratio = Police_Threat/Pirates 
Desired_Additional_Domestic_Police = Desired_Aditional_Police-External_Enforcement 
Desired_Aditional_Police = Excess_Pirates/Marg_Eff_of_Police 
Excess_Pirates = Lawlessness_Gap*Total_Population 
Expected_Pirate_Payoff = Pirate_Chance_of_Success*Potential_Earnings_Per_Pirates 
External_Enforcement = .5 
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Fishermen_Seeking_Police_Employment = 
Ratio_of_Fisherman_Seeking_Police_Employment*Fishermen 
Initial_Fisherman = 1000 
Initial_Pirates = 124 
Initial_Police = 0 
Lawlessness = Pirates/Total_Population 
Lawlessness_Gap = Lawlessness-Acceptable_Lawlessness 
Marg_Eff_of_External_Police = .9 
Marg_Eff_of_Police = .6 
Pirate_Adjustment_Time = 12 
Pirate_Attractiveness = (Expected_Pirate_Payoff/Average_Earnings_Per_Fisherman)*.01 
Pirate_Chance_of_Success = 1-Pirate_Chance_of_Failure 
Police_Adjustment_Delay = 12 
Police_Attractiveness = Average_Police_Earnings/Average_Earnings_Per_Fisherman 
Police_Threat = (External_Enforcement*Marg_Eff_of_External_Police) + 
((Police)*Marg_Eff_of_Police) 
Potential_Earnings_Per_Pirates = Average_Goods_Traffic/Pirates 
Time_to_Capture = 2 
Total_Population = Fishermen+Pirates+Police 
Pirate_Chance_of_Failure = GRAPH(Covered_Pirate_Ratio) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.2, 0.405), (0.4, 0.645), (0.6, 0.795), (0.8, 0.87), (1.00, 0.915), (1.20, 0.935), (1.40, 
0.94), (1.60, 0.945), (1.80, 0.945), (2.00, 0.945) 
Ratio_of_Fisherman_Seeking_Police_Employment = GRAPH(Police_Attractiveness) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.2, 0.00), (0.4, 0.01), (0.6, 0.035), (0.8, 0.13), (1.00, 0.5), (1.20, 0.78), (1.40, 0.88), 
(1.60, 0.935), (1.80, 0.97), (2.00, 0.975) 
 
 
 
